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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2013, the state of Florida filed a complaint against the 
state of Georgia in the U.S. Supreme Court.1 Florida alleged that 
Georgia had been extracting an increasing amount of water from 
interstate rivers to meet its agricultural, industrial, and municipal 
demand for water.2 Florida alleged that the increasing water 
extraction was drying up the Apalachicola River, Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint Basin, and floodplains.3 The Apalachicola River 
region hosts Florida’s largest river floodplain forest; the greatest 
number of freshwater fish species in Florida; over one hundred 
species that are endangered, threatened, or of concern under federal or 
state law; the second largest national estuarine research reserve; and, 
until recently, twelve percent of the nation’s eastern oyster harvest.4 
Florida asked the Supreme Court to equitably apportion the 
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin water, to enjoin Georgia 
“from interfering with Florida’s rights,” and to cap Georgia’s water 
uses at 1992 levels.5 
Equitable apportionment cases are not new to the Supreme Court. 
In 1907, the Supreme Court first articulated its power of equitable 
apportionment in Kansas v. Colorado.6 The Supreme Court has also 
heard an equitable apportionment case involving harm to oyster 
fisheries in eastern riparian states. In 1931, the Supreme Court 
decided New Jersey v. New York,7 which involved New York’s 
 
1 Florida’s Motion for Leave to File a Complaint, Complaint, and Brief in Support of 
Motion, Florida v. Georgia, 134 S. Ct. 1509 (2014) (No. 220142) [hereinafter Florida’s 
Complaint], available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10 
/ACF-Complaint.pdf. 
2 Id. at 3. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 10–12. 
5 Id. at 21. 
6 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
7 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931). 
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growing diversions from the Delaware River and, among many other 
issues, its injurious effects on New Jersey’s oysters.8 The Court 
limited New York to 440 million gallons per day—a level that would 
avoid harm to New Jersey’s recreation and oyster fisheries.9 The 
Supreme Court has heard eight other equitable apportionment cases.10 
Whether the states involved are Western prior appropriation states or 
Eastern riparian states affects the factors that the Supreme Court will 
consider and apply. The Court tends to incorporate state law, also 
called local law by the Court,11 into its equitable apportionment 
decisions. However, the Court reserves the right to displace state law 
and has done so in earlier cases. 
This Article addresses the history of equitable apportionment cases 
in the Supreme Court. It also analyzes factors that the Court has 
considered and applied in making equitable apportionment decisions 
in hopes of casting light on factors that the Court may consider if it 
takes Florida’s case against Georgia. 
I 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
Every state has a right to an equal share of interstate waters.12 
When states dispute the share of water to which they are entitled, the 
dispute can be resolved by interstate apportionment compact, 
Congressional apportionment, or an equitable apportionment suit with 
the Supreme Court.13 Equitable apportionment cases arise under the 
Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction. 
Original jurisdiction allows states to file a lawsuit directly with the 
Supreme Court rather than starting at a district court, appealing to a 
 
8 Id. at 343. 
9 Id. at 345. 
10 The Court did not decide any equitable apportionment cases between 1945 and 1982. 
A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 10:19 (2014 ed. 1988). 
11 This research memorandum will use only the term “state law” in order to avoid 
confusion. 
12 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at §§ 10:1–10:2. Interstate waters are waters that “cross 
state lines of form state boundaries.” Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation, in 3 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 43.01 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 2014). 
13 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:3. Grant, supra note 12, at § 43.02 (also noting that 
states may decide to regulate interstate water export or simply cooperate in the absence of 
an interstate compact). 
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circuit court, and appealing again to the Supreme Court.14 Further, 
when the lawsuit is between multiple states, as in an equitable 
apportionment case, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction.15 A 
state that is being sued cannot claim sovereign immunity to avoid an 
original jurisdiction action because Article III of the U.S. Constitution 
acts as a waiver of any state sovereign immunity.16 
In an equitable apportionment lawsuit, state citizens are the 
beneficiaries of any relief granted by the Supreme Court. But the 
Eleventh Amendment prohibits citizens from suing another state over 
interstate water rights.17 Thus, to avoid violating the Eleventh 
Amendment in equitable apportionment cases, states act in a parens 
patriae capacity even though state citizens are the ultimate 
beneficiaries.18 Indian tribes can also be parties to equitable 
apportionment cases because of their quasi-sovereign interests.19 
II 
EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT 
Equitable apportionment is a doctrine that was created by the 
Supreme Court to ensure that each state can enforce its right to an 
equal share of common waters.20 The doctrine can be traced back to 
1907, when Kansas sued Colorado over Colorado’s use of the 
Arkansas River.21 Even though Kansas’s complaint was dismissed 
and the case was not heard on the merits,22 the Court announced its 
power to equitably apportion interstate waters: 
Colorado denies that it is in any substantial manner diminishing the 
flow of the Arkansas river into Kansas. If that be true, then it is in 
no way infringing upon the rights of Kansas. If it is diminishing that 
flow, has it an absolute right to determine for itself the extent to 
 
14 States have this right because, under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme 
Court has original jurisdiction over all cases in which a state is a party. U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 2, cl. 2. 
15 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012); Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.02(a). 
16 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:3; Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 
313 (1934). 
17 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits “suits by citizens of one state against another 
state.” TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:7; U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
18 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:10; Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.03(a). 
19 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:13. 
20  Id. at § 10:2. 
21  Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
22  Id. at 117 (“[W]e are not satisfied that Kansas has made out a case entitling it to a 
decree.”). 
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which it will diminish it, even to the entire appropriation of the 
water? And if it has not that absolute right, is the amount of 
appropriation that it is now making such an infringment [sic] upon 
the rights of Kansas as to call for judicial interference? Is the 
question one solely between the states, or is the matter subject to 
national legislative regulation? and [sic], if the latter, to what extent 
has that regulation been carried? Clearly this controversy is one of a 
justiciable nature. The right to the flow of a stream was one 
recognized at common law, for a trespass upon which a cause of 
action existed.23 
Since Kansas v. Colorado, the Supreme Court has exercised its power 
of equitable apportionment in eight other cases.24 
In characterizing equitable apportionment, the Court has stated that 
“the effort always is to secure an equitable apportionment without 
quibbling over formulas.”25 The Court has also repeated that equitable 
apportionment is “a flexible doctrine which calls for ‘the exercise of 
an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors.’”26 
The body of Supreme Court equitable apportionment case law is 
limited to nine different rivers:27 
 Arkansas River—Kansas v. Colorado28 (riparian state v. 
appropriation state); 
 Catawba River—South Carolina v. North Carolina29 (riparian 
states); 
 
23 Id. at 85. 
24 See infra footnotes 28–36. 
25 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931); see also Colorado v. New 
Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982); Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.01. 
26 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 
325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945)); see also Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.01. 
27 There are nine true Supreme Court equitable apportionment cases.  See Grant, supra 
note 12, at § 45.01. Additionally, some water rights disputes between states in the 
Supreme Court were over interstate apportionment compacts and thus did not call on the 
Supreme Court’s power of equitable apportionment. 
28 Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (overruling Colorado’s demurrer to the bill 
of complaint); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (dismissing bill of complaint 
because Kansas failed to show inequitable division of benefits); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 
U.S. 383 (1943) (finding that Colorado’s water use had not materially increased since the 
original litigation and enjoining a Kansas association from suing individual water users in 
Colorado); Colorado v. Kansas, 322 U.S. 708 (1944) (issuing decree based on 1943 
opinion). 
29 South Carolina v. North Carolina, 552 U.S. 804 (2007) (granting motion for leave to 
file bill of complaint); South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256 (2010) (only 
addressing intervention by three non-sovereign entities, not apportioning water). 
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 Colorado River—Arizona v. California30 (prior appropriation 
states); 
 Connecticut River—Connecticut v. Massachusetts31 (riparian 
states); 
 Delaware River—New Jersey v. New York32 (riparian states); 
 Laramie River—Wyoming v. Colorado33 (prior appropriation 
states); 
 North Platte River—Nebraska v. Wyoming34 (prior 
appropriation states); 
 Vermejo River—Colorado v. New Mexico35 (prior 
appropriation states); 
 Walla Walla River—Washington v. Oregon36 (prior 
appropriation states). 
 
30 Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936) (denying petition for leave to file bill of 
complaint because the United States was an indispensable party and had not consented to 
the lawsuit); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (holding equitable apportionment 
did not apply because Congress has made a statutory apportionment). 
31 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931) (holding Connecticut has not 
proved injury or threat of injury by clear and convincing evidence); Connecticut v. 
Massachusetts, 283 U.S. 789 (1931) (dismissing bill of complaint). 
32 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931) (finding equitable apportionment 
relief for New Jersey and Pennsylvania); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931) 
(issuing decree based on 1931 opinion); New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1953) 
(denying Philadelphia leave to intervene in 1931 decree amendment proceedings); New 
Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954) (modifying 1931 decree). 
33 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (specifying apportionment and issuing 
decree based on opinion); Wyoming v. Colorado, 260 U.S. 1 (1922) (modifying 1922 
decree to fix an error); Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494 (1932) (interpreting decree 
and denying motion to dismiss); Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573 (1936) (interpreting 
decree and partially granting Wyoming’s request for injunctive relief); Wyoming v. 
Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940) (denying Wyoming’s request to hold Colorado in contempt 
for violating decree); Wyoming v. Colorado, 353 U.S. 953 (1957) (granting parties’ 
request to vacate and replace 1922 decree). 
34 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40 (1935) (denying motion to dismiss the bill of 
complaint); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (specifying apportionment); 
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 665 (1945) (issuing decree based on 1945 opinion); 
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 345 U.S. 981 (1953) (modifying decree based on party 
stipulation); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584 (1993) (denying summary judgment 
motions); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1 (1995) (allowing states to amend their 
pleadings); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40 (2001) (modifying decree and replacing 
1945 decree and 1953 modifications by stipulation of parties). 
35 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (remanding Special Master’s report 
for further findings); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) (finding Colorado 
had not proved facts entitling it to an apportionment). 
36 Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936) (holding Washington had not proved 
injury or threatened injury by clear and convincing evidence). 
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The Court entered decrees based on equitable apportionment in 
Wyoming v. Colorado, New Jersey v. New York, and Nebraska v. 
Wyoming.37 In the other cases, the Court declined to apportion the 
interstate rivers for various reasons.38 Although the Supreme Court 
can use its original jurisdiction to equitably apportion interstate 
waters, it is not required to.39 The Supreme Court has made it clear 
that it will exercise original jurisdiction sparingly.40 
A. Barriers to Relief: Procedural 
Equitable apportionment case law, though limited, establishes 
procedural barriers that can prevent a state from obtaining an 
apportionment decree.41 Foremost, the aggrieved state must file a 
motion for leave to file a complaint.42 However, the Supreme Court 
could reject that motion.43 Rejection would hinder a state’s chance to 
obtain an apportionment decree from the Court. When considering a 
state’s motion, the Court considers two factors.44 First, it considers 
whether the state’s interest is of “sufficient seriousness and dignity.”45 
Second, the Court considers whether there is an alternative forum in 
which to resolve the dispute.46 Although the Court does not articulate 
its reasons for denying leave to file a complaint, some believe this 
second factor caused the Court to deny South Dakota’s motion for 
leave to sue three states over the Missouri River.47 Because South 
Dakota was already in litigation with the United States—the party 
 
37 Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.07(a). 
38 Id. These were “the Arkansas River, the Colorado River, the Connecticut River, the 
Vermejo River, and the Walla Walla River.” The Court has yet to decide whether it will 
apportion the Catawba River at issue in South Carolina v. North Carolina. 
39 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:9. 
40 Id. (citing Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89 (1969)). 
41 Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Allocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme 
Court: The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River System, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 401, 
404 (2004). 
42 Id. at 404. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 405. 
45 Id. One commentator suggests that apportionment disputes generally meet this 
threshold because the Court has regularly accepted apportionment cases. Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 405–06. 
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actually at the base of the controversy—there was an appropriate 
alternative forum for the dispute.48 
Additionally, because the United States has sovereign immunity, 
the Court must dismiss the state’s suit if the United States is an 
indispensable party and does not consent to the lawsuit.49 Unless 
Congress gives the United States’ blanket statutory consent in 
equitable apportionment suits, the United States cannot be sued 
without its consent.50 
The state’s suit for equitable apportionment will also fail if 
Congress previously allocated the river at issue.51 The Court’s 
apportionment cannot supplant Congress’s apportionment.52 In 
Arizona v. California,53 the Court stated that Congress had provided 
its method for water allocation through the Boulder Canyon Project 
Act, which created a system of dams and public works to conserve 
and distribute water in the Lower Basin States.54 “Where Congress 
has so exercised its constitutional power over waters courts have no 
power to substitute their own notions of an ‘equitable apportionment’ 
for the apportionment chosen by Congress.”55 However, the Court in 
Arizona v. California clarified—and later cases affirmed—that if 
permitted by an action of Congress, states can “do things not 
inconsistent with the Project Act or with federal control of the 
river.”56 
The Court may also use the doctrine of ripeness to decline hearing 
equitable apportionment cases.57 The concept of ripeness typically 
requires that the case presents a question of law rather than a question 
of fact, and that the controversy warrants judicial intervention due to 
 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 408; Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.03(d). 
50 Grant, supra note 41, at 408. 
51 Id. at 409 (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564–65 (1963)). 
52 Id. 
53 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
54 Id. at 552, 565. The “Lower Basin States,” as used in the Colorado River Compact 
and Boulder Canyon Project Act, include California, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and 
Utah. 
55 Id. at 565; see also Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983) (“[U]nless the 
compact to which Congress has consented is somehow unconstitutional, no court may 
order relief inconsistent with its express terms.”). 
56 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 588; California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 
67429 (1978). 
57 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:14; Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 
1024 (1983) (extending equitable apportionment analysis to rights over interstate 
anadromous fish runs, declining to apportion due to lack of ripeness). 
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an actual or imminent legal dispute. But, because a state’s quasi-
sovereign interests are at stake in an equitable apportionment suit, the 
suing state “must meet a higher standard of proof of injury compared 
to a private water rights holder.”58 
The ripeness requirement was first articulated in Missouri v. 
Illinois,59 where Missouri tried to invoke the common law riparian 
right to a stream flow “unimpaired in quality and quantity.”60 The 
Court stated that “[b]efore this court ought to intervene, the case 
should be of serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and the 
principle to be applied should be one which the court is prepared 
deliberately to maintain against all consideration on the other side.”61 
The Court cited an equitable apportionment case, Kansas v. 
Colorado,62 to support this standard.63 The Court dismissed 
Missouri’s case for failing to present evidence that adequately 
supported its allegations.64 
Douglas Grant expounded the rule from Missouri v. Illinois into 
three requirements: “The invasion of rights must be (1) threatened, (2) 
of serious magnitude, and (3) clearly proved.”65 Notably, the “clearly 
proved” requirement needs to be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence.66 This is a greater standard of proof than what is required 
for a party “seeking an injunction in a suit between private parties.”67 
In Colorado v. New Mexico, the state of New Mexico needed to 
prove serious injury to prevent Colorado’s diversion.68 Once the 
Court determined that New Mexico successfully met its burden, the 
burden of proof shifted to Colorado “to show by clear and convincing 
 
58 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:14. 
59 Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). This case was an interstate water pollution 
case and not an equitable apportionment case, as Missouri was asking for an injunction, 
not apportionment. 
60 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:14. 
61 Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. at 521 (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 
(1902)); see also Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.04. 
62 Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). 
63 Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. at 521. 
64 Id. at 526. 
65 Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.04. 
66 Id. at § 45.04(c). 
67 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931); see also Grant, supra note 
12, at § 45.04(c). 
68 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982). 
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evidence that its proposed diversion was permissible under the 
doctrine of equitable apportionment.”69 This was the first case where 
the Court specifically “articulated and applied a rule shifting the 
burden of proof.”70 It is not clear whether this burden-shifting rule 
will apply to all equitable apportionment cases or just to cases 
involving requests for apportionment for future uses.71 
Though the Court is consistently reluctant “to exercise original 
jurisdiction where ripeness is not demonstrated” and the Court repeats 
the rule from Missouri v. Illinois in most subsequent equitable 
apportionment cases, the Court’s dicta surrounding the heightened 
standard has been inconsistently applied.72  
For example, in Nebraska v. Wyoming,73 the Court stated that the 
record’s statistics did not show exactly the extent or existence of 
actual damage to Nebraska, but that “deprivation of water in arid or 
semiarid regions cannot help but be injurious.”74 The Court came to 
this finding even after explicitly recognizing the higher standard to 
prove an invasion of rights articulated in Missouri v. Illinois.75 The 
Court stated that Nebraska’s evidence might not be enough to enjoin 
threatened injury in a hypothetical equity suit, but that it was enough 
to support justiciability in an equitable apportionment suit.76 
Additionally, the Court clarified that it apportioned the Laramie River 
in Wyoming v. Colorado when the only evidence of “injury or threat 
of injury was the inadequacy of the supply of water to meet all 
appropriate rights.”77 Because of the Court’s uncertain and possibly 
inconsistent use of the heightened standard of proof of injury for 
ripeness in equitable apportionment cases, it is unclear how this 
standard would be applied in Florida v. Georgia, or if it would be 
used to dismiss the lawsuit. 
Equitable apportionment cases have expressed different standards 
for proof of injury when a state asks the Court to enforce a decree.78 
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court stated that “the only question is 
 
69 Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.04(c). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:14; Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.04. 
73 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
74 Id. at 610. 
75 Id. at 608. 
76 Id. at 610. 
77 Id. 
78 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:14. 
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whether [the] conduct violates a right established by the decree”79 and 
the state must show “it is injured by the administration of [the 
decree].”80 On the other hand, the Court in Kansas v. Colorado 
indicated that the standards for enforcing an interstate decree and an 
interstate compact are the same.81 Asking the Court to modify a 
decree requires a slightly lower standard than equitable 
apportionment, as the state need only establish “substantial injury.”82 
The jurisprudence surrounding decrees is less relevant here because 
there is no decree at issue in Florida v. Georgia. 
B. Principle of Fair Allocation 
The modern principle of equitable apportionment is one of fair 
allocation rather than necessarily adhering to state laws or 
expectations.83 However, the Supreme Court “has incorporated [state] 
law into the doctrine of equitable apportionment” and applied shared 
state water laws if the party states share water law systems.84 If all 
party states are riparian states, the Court has typically applied riparian 
principles, and if all party states are prior appropriation states, the 
Court has typically applied prior appropriation principles.85 
The Court reserves the power to displace state laws but has only 
done so when a state tried to use its laws to gain an unfair advantage 
over another state.86 In other words, the Court has traditionally 
applied shared state water law unless one state will suffer substantial 
prejudice.87 Thus, state law has been the Court’s preferred method of 
 
79 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 592 (1993). 
80 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:14. 
81 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:14. 
82 Id. (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584 (1993)). 
83 Id. at § 10:15; New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931). 
84 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:15.  
85 Id. 
86 Id.; see also Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 
(1938) (reversing a decree granted by Colorado that appropriated all of a river’s flow to 
Colorado users, leaving none for users in New Mexico). 
87 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:18. The Supreme Court has found prejudice 
substantial enough to displace state law in three instances: (1) “when the established 
economies would be disrupted,” (2) “when a call by a downstream state would be futile[,]” 
and (3) “when a minor modification of priority would maximize the use of water among 
all parties to the litigation.” Id.; Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (deviating 
from prior appropriation and subordinating Nebraska’s priority to protect Colorado’s 
existing economy); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936) (holding for Oregon in  
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allocation.88 But again, the Court reserves the power to displace state 
law in favor of fair allocation.89 
So, if the Court reserves the right to displace state law and apply 
fair allocation doctrine, what are the tenants of fair allocation? The 
Court has used fair allocation to consider a wide variety of relevant 
factors, but it has primarily focused on protecting established uses.90 
The Court applies fair allocation principles in Western prior 
appropriation states differently than in Eastern riparian states.  
III 
FACTORS IN EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT CASE LAW 
In October 2013, the state of Florida filed an equitable 
apportionment action against the state of Georgia in the Supreme 
Court.91 Georgia then filed its response in January 2014.92 
Subsequently, Florida filed a reply in February 2014.93 Shortly 
thereafter, Florida’s petition was distributed for conference.94 The 
conference process determines whether the Court will take Florida’s 
case. The Court asked the United States for its view on the dispute.95 
Guesses about what factors the Court would consider, should it 
take Florida’s case, are based on equitable apportionment precedent. 
Some factors that the Court has historically considered differ based on 
whether the states are Western prior appropriation states or Eastern 
riparian states, while some factors are common between both types of 
states.  
 
part because Washington’s priority call would be futile because any water gained would be 
lost in the channel’s deep gravel); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (slightly 
displacing priority by following the Special Master’s recommended 75%-25% split). 
88 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:18.  
89 Id. at § 10:15. 
90 Id. at § 10:16. 
91 Florida’s Complaint, supra note 1. 
92 State of Georgia’s Opposition to Florida’s Motion for Leave to File a Complaint, 
Florida v. Georgia, 134 S. Ct. 1509 (2014) (No. 220142), available at http://static              
-lobbytools.s3.amazonaws.com/press/65588_14_georgia_response_in_u_s_supreme 
_court_to_florida_lawsuit.pdf. 
93 Florida v. Georgia, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www 
.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/22o142.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 
2014). 
94 Id. 
95 Lyle Denniston, Court Grants Five Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Posted Mon, Mar. 3. 
2014 10:06 am), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/court-grants-five-cases/. 
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A. Factors in Case Law for Both Types of Water Law Systems 
The Supreme Court held in Nebraska v. Wyoming that “all of the 
factors which create equities in favor of one state or the other must be 
weighed.”96 Factors that the Court has considered include a 
comparison of harms and benefits, measures that could improve 
efficient water use and enhance supplies of water, protection of 
existing economies that use the water, the size of party states’ river 
basin drainage areas and their contributions to in-stream flows, and 
the availability of alternative water supplies.97 
While these factors are present, “[t]he Supreme Court has said little 
about how it weighs conflicting apportionment factors, and what it 
has said leaves much room for interpretation.”98 Generally, the Court 
has stated that equitable apportionment is “a flexible doctrine which 
calls for ‘the . . . consideration of many factors.’”99 Some think that 
this leads to near-total discretion for the Court in equitable 
apportionment cases.100 
1. Harm-Benefit Comparison 
The Supreme Court has undertaken a comparison of harms and 
benefits regardless of the water law system followed by the party 
states.101 It seems to be the most frequently, explicitly, and 
extensively considered factor.102 In Colorado v. New Mexico,103 the 
Court indicated its willingness to allow the harm-benefit comparison 
to override other factors, including priority of appropriation.104 
In its first equitable apportionment case, the Court balanced a 
narrow set of harms and benefits.105 It considered evidence regarding 
irrigation development by analyzing “population changes, acreage 
 
96 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945) (quoting Colorado v. Kansas, 320 
U.S. 383, 394 (1943)). 
97 Grant, supra note 41, at 413-14413; Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.06(c)(4). 
98 Grant, supra note 41, at 425. 
99 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982). 
100 Grant, supra note 41, at 426. 
101 Id. at 414. 
102 Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.06(c)(1). 
103 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982). 
104 Grant, supra note 41, at 415–16. This possibility is discussed more extensively in 
Part C. 
105 Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.06(c)(2). 
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cultivated, bushels produced, and value of crops produced.”106 Later, 
in New York v. New Jersey, the Court apportioned the river to protect 
oyster fisheries and recreational uses but not to alleviate other alleged 
harms including “injury to navigation, shad fisheries, municipal water 
supply, future water power development, and cultivated lands 
adjoining the river.”107 However, one should not assume that these 
uses are irrelevant to a future harm-benefit comparison. The Court in 
New York v. New Jersey and in Connecticut v. Massachusetts declined 
to protect uses or include them in the harm-benefit comparison when 
the state failed to show that those interests were seriously 
threatened.108 Thus, if a state can show that a use is seriously 
threatened by the diversion, the use could be weighed in the harm-
benefit comparison. 
The Court declined to protect Colorado’s projected future uses in 
Colorado v. New Mexico in part because Colorado’s projected future 
uses were too uncertain, and Colorado had not undertaken any type of 
long-range planning and analysis.109 
2. Protection of Existing Economies 
In Colorado v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court stated that “the 
equities supporting the protection of existing economies will usually 
be compelling. The harm that may result from disrupting established 
uses is typically certain and immediate, whereas the potential benefits 
from a proposed diversion may be speculative and remote.”110 The 
Court has been reluctant to divert water away from an established 
economy that uses the water supply.111 
An analysis of Wyoming v. Colorado, Colorado v. New Mexico, 
Nebraska v. Wyoming, and Washington v. Oregon indicates “that 
avoiding harm to an existing economy is a weighty factor in 




108 Id. at § 45.06(c)(2), (c)(2) n.297. 
109 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 321–22 (1984). 
110 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 (1982). 
111 Grant, supra note 41, at 420. 
112 Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.06(c)(1). 
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3. Size of River Basin Drainage Areas and Contributions to In-Stream 
Flows 
The role that the size of party states’ river basin drainage areas and 
contributions to in-stream flows is uncertain.113 It is certainly not as 
strong of a factor as the three above. The Supreme Court asked for 
information regarding this factor in Kansas v. Colorado114 and alluded 
to them in the apportionment in New Jersey v. New York.115 But the 
Court in Colorado v. New Mexico stated that the source of the 
disputed water should be irrelevant to the states’ claims for 
apportionment.116 
4. Availability of Alternative Water Supplies 
The Supreme Court in Colorado v. New Mexico instructed the 
Special Master to analyze the availability of alternate water sources 
available to either state.117 The availability of substitute water would 
mitigate harms to water users in either state. For the purposes of the 
case, neither state had alternate water supplies that factored into the 
Court’s decision. 
The Court also considered substitute water supplies in Connecticut 
v. Massachusetts.118 The Court, however, determined that the 
suggested alternate water supplies were not realistic options because 
the waters were inferior for a number of quality and quantity 
reasons.119 
B. Factors in Western (Appropriation) States 
Due to the drier nature of Western states, the Supreme Court has 
heard more equitable apportionment cases between western states 
than between eastern states. These cases include Wyoming v. 
 
113 Grant, supra note 41, at 422. 
114 Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 141–45, 147 (1902); see also Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (stating nothing about how the information about the 
drainage area affected the Court’s decision). 
115 See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931) (failing to explain why its 
apportionment was measured in cubic feet per second per square mile, which linked the 
appropriation to the size of the drainage area and contributions to stream flow). 
116 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 323 (1984). 
117 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 189 (1982). 
118 Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.06(c)(4). 
119 Id. 
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Colorado (1922), Washington v. Oregon (1936), Nebraska v. 
Wyoming (1945), Arizona v. California (1963), and Colorado v. New 
Mexico (1984). 
1. Priority of Appropriation 
In a 1911 case, the Supreme Court articulated that states that adopt 
the same water law estop themselves from ignoring water priorities of 
the other state.120 The Court upheld this logic in Wyoming v. 
Colorado121 in 1922 when the Court “adopted prior appropriation as 
the standard of equitable apportionment among western states.”122 
Colorado made the riparian-esque argument that it could more 
beneficially use the water, but the Court upheld Wyoming’s 
priority.123 In Nebraska v. Wyoming, a case between two prior 
appropriation states, the Court said that “[p]riority of appropriation is 
the guiding principle.”124 Indeed, priority of appropriation is an 
important factor that the Court will consider in equitable 
apportionment cases between prior appropriation states.125 
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court provided its most complete list 
of factors relevant to equitable apportionment in addition to priority 
of appropriation:126 
[P]hysical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in 
the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return 
flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage 
water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the 
damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to 
downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former—these 
are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative not an 
exhaustive catalogue.127 
2. Departure from Prior Appropriation 
Though the Supreme Court has generally stated its ability to depart 
from state law since Connecticut v. Massachusetts,128 the Court has 
 
120 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:17; Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485, 487 (1911). 
121 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). 
122 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:17; see also Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 
495. 
123 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:17. 
124 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945). 
125 Grant, supra note 41, at 415. 
126 Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.06(a). 
127 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 618. 
128 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931). 
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indicated its willingness to depart from prior appropriation doctrine 
based on specific facts in two cases.129 The Court departed from 
priorities in Nebraska v. Wyoming130 to protect the junior use of an 
existing economy—ranching and irrigated hay and pasturage fields—
in Colorado.131  In Colorado v. New Mexico,132 the Court expressed 
that a harm-benefit comparison could justify a departure from 
priorities,133 but did not depart from priorities in that case.134 “[I]t 
appears that harm-benefit comparison can more readily supplant 
priorities when the conflict is between two groups of long-continued, 
existing uses than when it is between proposed uses and existing 
uses.”135 So although priority of appropriation principles can be 
overcome, particularly by a harm-benefit comparison, it is difficult to 
do so, and prior appropriation states have not had much success in 
overcoming the prior appropriation doctrine.136 
3. Conservation Measures and the Harm-Benefit Comparison 
In more recent equitable apportionment cases between prior 
appropriation states, the Supreme Court has indicated that it may be 
moving toward incorporating water conservation principles into prior 
appropriation law.137 In Colorado v. New Mexico,138 the Court 
indicated that it may consider “whether reasonable [water] 
conservation measures in the downstream state might offset any 
 
129 Grant, Interstate Water Allocation, supra note 12, at § 45.06(b). 
130 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
131 Id. at 621–22. 
132 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982). 
133 Id. 
134 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984). 
135 Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.06(c)(1). 
136 Id.; see also Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 469 (1922) (rejecting Colorado’s 
allegation that Wyoming’s uses of the water was relatively unproductive when Colorado 
used the water for similar uses and productivity); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 
324 (1984). 
137 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:19; see also Harrison C. Dunning, State Equitable 
Apportionment of Western Water Resources, 66 NEB. L. REV. 76, 78 (1987) (stating that 
the emphasis of the prior appropriation system “has shifted to better management of our 
developed water supply” because of the increased difficulty of building contemporary 
water projects). The Court first showed its concern with conservation in Wyoming v. 
Colorado, where in its apportionment it required conservation measures and analyzed the 
efficiency of water uses that existed on the river. Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.06(c)(3). 
138 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984). 
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injuries suffered [due to] the upstream diversion.”139 The Court stated 
that apportionment need “not focus exclusively on the priority of uses 
along the river, and that other factors—such as waste, availability of 
reasonable conservation measures, and the balance of benefit and 
harm from diversion—could be considered in the apportionment 
calculus.”140 This was the first time that the Court indicated that water 
users have a duty to conserve water in order to successfully claim an 
equitable apportionment of the disputed water.141 
In Colorado v. New Mexico, Colorado asked the Supreme Court to 
equitably apportion the Vermejo River, which was completely 
appropriated by New Mexico users.142 The Court stated “that 
Colorado’s proof would be judged by a clear-and-convincing-
evidence standard,” which, in the Court’s words, meant that “a 
diversion of interstate water should be allowed only if Colorado could 
place in the ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that the truth of 
its factual contentions are ‘highly probable.’”143 The Court ruled for 
New Mexico because Colorado had not shown with clear and 
convincing evidence that the Court should permit Colorado’s 
diversion.144 The Court identified two areas where Colorado failed to 
show with clear and convincing evidence that the proposed diversion 
should be permitted. 
First, Colorado alleged that New Mexico could compensate for 
Colorado’s proposed diversion by implementing reasonable 
conservation measures.145 New Mexico proved that it would be 
injured by Colorado’s diversion, so the burden of proof switched to 
Colorado, the diverter, “to show that reasonable conservation 
measures exist.”146 Although the water conservancy district in New 
Mexico was less efficient than some other districts in New Mexico, 
Colorado failed to identify specific conservation measures that New 
Mexico could take to conserve the disputed water supply.147 
 
139 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:19 (citing Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 
187 (1982)). 
140 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. at 310. 
141 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:19. 
142 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. at 310. 
143 Id. at 316 (citing C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 320 (1954)). 
144 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:19 (citing Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 
(1984)). 
145 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. at 318–19. 
146 Id. at 321. 
147 Id. at 318–19; TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:19 (citing Colorado v. New Mexico, 
467 U.S. 310, 318 (1984)). 
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Second, Colorado had the burden to show that injury to New 
Mexico from the diversion would be outweighed by the benefits to 
Colorado.148 Colorado failed to make this showing by clear and 
convincing evidence because it had not implemented long-term 
planning or analysis for the diverted water, so benefits could not be 
studied or predicted.149 The Court indicated that long-term state 
planning would decrease the uncertainty of equitable apportionment 
judgments because it would allow a state to show that its economy, 
existing or future, could use water more efficiently than another 
state.150 This portion of the case helped establish that a state will have 
to produce hard evidence of injury or need in order to supplant the 
water rights of states with legitimate priority claims.151 
Additionally, the Court gave no weight to the fact that the water 
originates in Colorado.152 Where the water originates is irrelevant to 
determining equitable apportionment in prior appropriation states.153 
Importantly, the Court referred to water conservation measures and 
the harm-benefit comparison as “relevant factors” that states seeking 
a diversion must prove.154 In sum, in addition to priority of 
appropriation considerations in equitable apportionment suits between 
prior appropriation states, the state seeking a diversion must show: (1) 
“the extent to which reasonable conservation measures can adequately 
compensate for the reduction in supply due to the diversion” and (2) 
“the extent to which the benefits from the diversion will outweigh the 
harms to existing users.”155 
C. Factors in Eastern (Riparian) States 
Few Supreme Court equitable appropriation cases between riparian 
states exist. These cases are New Jersey v. New York156 (1931), 
 
148 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. at 321–22. 
149 Id. at 322–23. 
150 Id. at 322. 
151 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:19. 
152 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. at 323. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 323–24. 
156 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931). 
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Connecticut v. Massachusetts157 (1931), and South Carolina v. North 
Carolina158 (2010). As the Court has not yet discussed apportionment 
in South Carolina v. North Carolina, the existing riparian cases that 
shed light on what factors the Court may use in an equitable 
apportionment case between two riparian states, such as Florida and 
Georgia, are dated by almost a century. 
1. Riparian Doctrine 
In equitable apportionment cases in eastern states, as in western 
states, the Supreme Court tends to base its decisions on state law.159 
New Jersey v. New York,160 decided in 1931, was an early major 
equitable apportionment case in which the Supreme Court’s 
apportionment between the riparian states (1) reflected riparian 
principles and (2) expressly declined to apply prior appropriation 
doctrine.161 
The Court in Connecticut v. Massachusetts dismissed 
Connecticut’s action largely because the state failed to show any 
injury.162 A. Dan Tarlock asserts that this is actually in line with “the 
more ‘modern’ common law rule that only transwatershed diversions 
that actually caused injury to downstream riparians were 
actionable.”163 This modern common law rule prohibits lawsuits 
regarding diversions that do not cause injury to downstream riparians. 
Thus, any modern equitable apportionment case between riparian 
states might also apply the same precedent and principle. 
2. Departures from Riparian Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has departed from riparian doctrine in some 
cases because riparian common law includes doctrines that frustrate 
 
157 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931). Tarlock cites to Missouri v. 
Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), to illustrate “[t]he importance of riparian principles and 
marginal reductions in base water levels” but this is not a true equitable apportionment 
case as Missouri was seeking an injunction, not apportionment. Tarlock, supra note 10, at 
§ 10:21. 
158 South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256 (2010). Thus far, the Court in South 
Carolina v. North Carolina has addressed intervention of three non-sovereign parties but 
has not addressed the apportionment issue. The case will not feature prominently in this 
analysis. 
159 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:20. 
160 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931). 
161 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:21. 
162 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931). 
163 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:22. 
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the concept of equitable apportionment between riparian states.164 The 
Court has declined to follow at least some of these doctrines.165 For 
example, enforcing the natural flow doctrine in an equitable 
apportionment case could prevent states from holding and distributing 
its apportioned share because the doctrine prevents upstream state 
impoundments.166 The Court declined to follow the natural flow 
doctrine in New Jersey v. New York.167 
Riparian common law also includes a rule that uses outside of the 
watershed are per se unreasonable.168 The Court declined to follow 
that rule in Connecticut v. Massachusetts169 because it would have 
prevented Massachusetts from using some proportion of the disputed 
waters.170 In expressing its willingness to depart from riparian 
doctrines, the Court stated “riparian rights . . . do not necessarily 
constitute a dependable guide or just basis for the decision of 
controversies such as that here presented.”171 
3. Contribution to Stream Flow 
Some commentators think that the Supreme Court’s comparison 
between riparian and appropriative rights in Colorado v. New 
Mexico—stating that contribution to stream flow is irrelevant in 
appropriation states—might have left the door open for contribution 
as a relevant factor in riparian states.172 The commentators think that 
because the Court indicated that riparian rights are tied to land 
ownership, this indicated that contribution might matter.173 But 
consider the fact that much of a state’s snow and rain that contributes 
to stream flow originates on non-riparian land. This analysis, too, is 
complicated by the hydrology and interconnectedness of groundwater 
 
164 Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.06(b) (citing Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 
660, 670 (1931)); TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:22. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Catherine L. Dirck, Comment, Federal Reserved Rights and the Interstate 
Allocation of Water, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 813 (1978). 
168 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:22. 
169 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931). 
170 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:22 
171 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931). 
172 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 323 (1984); Grant, supra note 41, at 424. 
173 Grant, supra note 41, at 424. 
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and surface water.174 The flow and availability of surface water is 
affected by withdrawals of connected groundwater.175 This 
interconnectedness may be a relevant legal consideration in Florida v. 
Georgia because the waters at issue are subject to extensive 
groundwater withdrawals. Others think that as in cases involving prior 
appropriation states, contribution to stream flow will not be a relevant 
factor in equitable apportionment cases involving riparian states.176 
4. Thoughts on Conservation Measures in Equitable Apportionment 
Cases Between Riparian States 
One question about Florida v. Georgia, if it is taken by the 
Supreme Court, is whether the court will include analysis of 
conservation measures as it has in prior appropriation cases. In 
Colorado v. New Mexico, the Court stated that factors such as waste 
and possible conservation measures could be included in the equitable 
apportionment determination.177 As competition for water resources in 
the East intensifies, might the Court include this factor even for an 
analysis among riparian states? 
Colorado v. New Mexico was decided in 1984. This was the first 
time the Court made water conservation measures an explicit 
requirement for states to claim an equitable apportionment.178 The last 
equitable apportionment case between riparian states was in 1931, so 
the Court did not have the example of Colorado v. New Mexico to 
follow. There is the possibility that because competition for water 
resources is intensifying in riparian states, the Court may decide to 
follow Colorado v. New Mexico in future cases and include 
conservation measures in the analysis. 
This line of thinking could be rebutted by the fact that the Court 
first showed its concern with conservation in Wyoming v. Colorado in 
1922.179 In its apportionment, the Court required conservation 
measures and analyzed the efficiency of water uses that existed on the 
river.180 Wyoming v. Colorado was decided before the equitable 
 
174 J. David Aiken, Hydrologically-Connected Ground Water, Section 858, and the 
Spear T Ranch Decision, 84 Neb. L. Rev. 962, 965–74 (2006) (explaining the hydrology 
and interconnectedness of groundwater and surface water). 
175 Id. at 972. 
176 Grant, supra note 41, at 424. 
177 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. at 313–14. 
178 TARLOCK, supra note 10, at § 10:19. 
179 Grant, supra note 12, at § 45.06(c)(3). 
180 Id. 
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apportionment cases between riparian states, so the Court, if it had 
wanted to include conservation aspects into its decision, did in fact 
have a precedent. The Court, however, did not include water 
conservation aspects in its decision in New Jersey v. New York or 
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, which possibly indicates that it prefers 
to omit conservation considerations from equitable apportionment 
cases between riparian states. 
D. Modern Environmental Law Considerations: No Precedent in 
Equitable Apportionment Case Law 
Most of the equitable apportionment cases were decided before the 
advent of modern environmental law in the 1970s. The most recently 
decided case, Colorado v. New Mexico,181 was decided in 1984, and 
the Supreme Court did not discuss the impact of environmental laws, 
if any, on its decision.182 
Modern environmental laws factor into non-equitable 
apportionment water law cases. These environmental laws function to 
maintain in-stream flows, protect endangered and threatened species, 
preserve aquatic ecosystems and habitats, and protect other 
environmental values. Some of these decisions have been very 
controversial when environmental laws take precedence over other 
water uses like agriculture.183 
Considering the significant role that modern environmental law can 
play in water law cases, it is possible that the Court would factor 
considerations from environmental law into an equitable 
apportionment case. This may be especially relevant in Florida v. 
Georgia, as Florida’s complaint emphasizes the ecology, diverse 
wildlife, aquatic habitat, and endangered and threatened species in the 
Apalachicola Region threatened by decreasing water resources.184 
However, there is no precedent in equitable apportionment cases 
indicating that modern environmental law would factor into an 
equitable apportionment analysis today. 
 
181 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984). 
182 Id. 
183 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Kempthorne, 2007 WL 4462395, at 
*1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007) (recounting the court’s preliminary injunction protecting the 
delta smelt in California). 
184 Florida’s Complaint, supra note 1, at 10–13, 15–16, 19–20, 21. 
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CONCLUSION 
With little case law regarding equitable apportionment between 
riparian states, attempting to predict what factors the Supreme Court 
would consider in Florida v. Georgia is difficult. Moreover, this 
difficulty is amplified by the fact that the two finalized equitable 
apportionment cases between riparian states were decided almost a 
century ago. 
Nonetheless, one can postulate several points. First, the Court 
likely would apply riparian law, as both Florida and Georgia are 
riparian law states. Second, the Court might depart from doctrines of 
riparian law that hinder its ability to fairly apportion. Third, the Court 
would likely compare the harms and benefits of the proposed 
apportionment. Fourth, the fact that existing economies depend on the 
water to be apportioned would likely weigh into the harm-benefit 
comparison. For instance, two relevant facts would be that Georgia’s 
irrigated agriculture uses more water than its industrial and municipal 
uses combined, and Florida’s existing economies include the oyster 
industry, tourism, and recreational uses.185 The Court would have an 
interesting question regarding the value of the natural resources and 
wildlife refuge as an existing economy or compared to existing 
traditional economies. Fifth, the Court would likely analyze the 
availability of possible alternate water supplies. 
One can only surmise what other, if any, modern environmental 
law considerations would factor into the Court’s equitable 
apportionment analysis. Most of the equitable apportionment case law 
was decided before modern environmental law and the Court does not 
address such issues in the most recently decided case. Even though 
modern environmental laws can play a significant role in water law 
cases and Florida has a unique ecosystem at stake, no equitable 
apportionment precedent indicates that these laws would factor into 
an equitable apportionment decision today. 
 
185 Id. at 10–13. 
